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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review summarizes important
decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The purpose of the
Review is to indicate cases of first impression, cases of significantly altered
earlier interpretations of North Dakota law, and other cases of interest. As a
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1. The North Dakota Law Review would like to thank the 2011-12 student articles editor,
Jonathan Voigt for his hard work in writing these Supreme Court Reviews. A special thanks to
Associate Editor Jennifer Albaugh for her work on the In Re R.A. review.
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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT—THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY—
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In re Disciplinary Action Against Lucas
In In re Disciplinary Action Against Lucas,2 the Disciplinary Board
recommended Attorney A. William Lucas be publicly reprimanded and pay
the costs of the disciplinary proceeding after the panel found that Lucas
violated North Dakota Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 by communicating
with a represented party.3 Counsel for the Disciplinary Board objected to
the recommendation, contending Lucas should be suspended from the
practice of law for thirty days.4 Lucas argued the evidence did not support
the conclusion that he violated Rule 4.2.5 The North Dakota Supreme
Court ruled clear and convincing evidence established Lucas violated the
rule, and the court ordered Lucas be suspended from the practice of law for
thirty days and pay the costs of the proceeding.6 Chief Justice VandeWalle,
joined by Surrogate Judge Graff, sitting in place of Justice Maring,
dissented because the court did not adopt the hearing panel’s sanction.7
The Disciplinary Board filed a petition for discipline against Lucas in
April 2009, claiming Lucas violated Rule 4.2 by sending letters to his
Condominium Association and members of its board about pending
litigation while the Association was represented by counsel.8 Lucas was a
party to two cases against the Association, and he represented himself in
both cases.9 The Association was represented by counsel in those cases.10
During the second case, Lucas sent two letters to the board of the
Association, one to a board member and one to an officer.11 These letters,
as well as subsequent ones, criticized the Association’s lawyer’s performance, sought information about an interrogatory answer, and expressed a
desire to settle the case.12

2. 2010 ND 187, 789 N.W.2d 73.
3. In re Disciplinary Action Against Lucas, ¶ 1, 789 N.W.2d at 74.
4. Id. ¶¶ 1, 15, 789 N.W.2d at 74, 77.
5. Id. ¶ 1, 789 N.W.2d at 74.
6. Id.
7. Id. ¶ 22, 789 N.W.2d at 79 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting).
8. Id. ¶ 2, 789 N.W.2d at 74 (majority opinion).
9. Id. ¶ 3.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. ¶ 4, 789 N.W.2d at 74-75.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court explained that while Rule 4.2 forbids
attorneys from speaking to a represented party in a matter about the subject
of the matter, it does not specify whether the rule applies to attorneys
representing themselves.13 The court noted Lucas sent letters to the
Association’s board, which was represented by counsel, as well as a board
member and officer, who have authority to act on issues in litigation.14 Due
to their authorization, the letters were, therefore, sent to people who were
included under the scope of Rule 4.2.15
Lucas argued the letters do not violate Rule 4.2 because he was
representing himself in the litigation.16 The court rejected his reasoning as
“too narrow.”17 The court demonstrated Rule 4.2 was designed to protect
represented parties from “overreaching by other lawyers who are
participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the lawyerclient relationship, and the uncounseled disclosure of information relating
to the representation.”18 In other words, the rule was created “to prevent
lawyers from taking advantage of laypersons.”19 The court also noted the
majority of courts in other states have applied Rule 4.2 to attorneys
representing themselves.20
Lucas relied on a case from the Connecticut Supreme Court, Pinsky v.
Statewide Grievance Committee,21 which ruled an attorney representing
himself could communicate with a represented party because the attorney
was not representing a client.22 The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected
this reasoning, however, in favor of the majority rule. The court explained
the majority rule as expressed in In re Disciplinary Action Against Haley23
and Runsvold v. Idaho State Bar24 fits better with the court’s precedent and
explained “the policies underlying [Rule 4.2] are better served by extending
the restriction to lawyers acting pro se.”25

13. Id. ¶ 7, 789 N.W.2d at 75.
14. Id. ¶ 8, 789 N.W.2d at 75-76.
15. Id. at 76.
16. Id. ¶ 9.
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 1 (2012)).
19. Id. (quoting In re Disciplinary Action Against Hoffman, 2003 ND 161, ¶ 17, 670 N.W.2d
500, 504).
20. Id.
21. 578 A.2d 1075 (Conn. 1990).
22. In re Disciplinary Action Against Lucas, ¶ 10, 789 N.W.2d at 76 (citing Pinsky, 578 A.2d
at 1079).
23. 126 P.3d 1262 (Wash. 2006).
24. 925 P.2d 1118 (Idaho 1996).
25. In re Disciplinary Action Against Lucas, ¶ 10, 789 N.W.2d at 76 (quoting In re
Disciplinary Action Against Haley, 126 P.3d at 1267).
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Both parties further challenged the sanction imposed on Lucas by the
hearing panel.26 Disciplinary Counsel argued suspension was a more
appropriate sanction because Lucas had been suspended once before for
similar conduct.27 Lucas argued that because he was relying on Pinsky, he
should not be sanctioned for his conduct.28
The North Dakota Supreme Court held Lucas’ prior conduct, along
with the fact that the majority of jurisdictions had rejected Pinsky, should
have informed Lucas that his letters to the Association board, board
member, and officer violated Rule 4.2.29 The court noted suspension is
generally appropriate if a lawyer has previously been reprimanded for
similar conduct.30 The court, therefore, concluded reprimand was not a
sufficient sanction, and ordered Lucas be suspended from the practice of
law for thirty days.31
Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote a dissenting opinion, asserting the
court should have adhered to the hearing panel’s sanction.32 The Chief
Justice agreed Lucas’ conduct violated Rule 4.2.33 He did not agree,
however, that a lawyer should be disciplined for relying on a minority
position if the court has not yet rejected that position.34 For that reason, the
Chief Justice would have imposed public reprimand rather than
suspension.35

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. ¶ 15, 789 N.W.2d at 77.
Id.
Id. ¶ 16, 789 N.W.2d at 78.
Id.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id.
Id. ¶ 22, 789 N.W.2d at 78-79 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 23, 789 N.W.2d at 79.
Id.
Id. ¶ 25.
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AUTOMOBILES—EVIDENCE OF SOBRIETY TESTS—MOTORISTS’
RIGHT TO TEST OR TO ADDITIONAL OR ALTERNATIVE TEST
State v. Tompkins
In State v. Tompkins,36 Randy Tomkins appealed the criminal judgment
entered after he conditionally pled guilty to the charge of driving under the
influence.37 Tompkins reserved the right to appeal the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress.38 The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the district court’s decision, holding the State did not
impermissibly interfere with Tompkins’ right to obtain and independent
blood test.39
In October 2009, Tompkins was arrested and charged with driving
under the influence.40 After being stopped for a problem with his muffler
and put through several field sobriety tests, Tompkins was placed under
arrest.41 Tompkins was then taken to the Jamestown law enforcement
center, where he was given a breath test.42 The test indicated his bloodalcohol content exceeded the legal limit.43 Tompkins requested a blood
test, and the officer replied that he could have one in addition to the breath
test, but at his own expense.44 The officer then drove Tompkins to the
Jamestown Hospital for the blood test and informed the hospital staff, while
en route, that they would be coming for an independent blood test.45
The officer remained present while the blood draw was performed.46
The nurse performing the draw used the State Crime Lab kit, which the
hospital uses for all blood draws that may be introduced in court.47 The
blood draw was sent to the State Crime Lab to be analyzed.48 The nurse
who administered the blood test admitted sending the sample to the State
Crime Lab was standard procedure for legal, rather than personal medical

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

2011 ND 61, 795 N.W.2d 351.
Tompkins, ¶ 1, 795 N.W.2d at 353.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. at 353-54.
Id. at 354.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
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purposes.49 The State Crime Lab analyzed the blood sample and returned
the results to the Jamestown Hospital.50 The Stutsman County State’s
Attorney’s office also received a copy of the results.51
Tomkins argued that because the officer did not adequately explain to
him his rights in obtaining an independent blood test, the nurse used the
State Crime Lab test kit, the State Crime Lab analyzed the sample, and the
State’s attorney received a copy of the results, the State improperly
interfered with his right to obtain and independent blood test.52 Therefore,
Tomkins argued the blood test as well as the initial breath test given by the
police should be suppressed.53 The district court partially agreed, suppressing the blood test because “there was too much government involvement.”54
The district court, however, did not suppress the breath test, and Tompkins
entered his conditional guilty plea reserving the right to appeal the district
court’s decision.55
On appeal, Tompkins argued the district court erred when it suppressed
the blood test for excessive state involvement, but failed to also suppress
the breath test.56 The North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis by
noting suppression of a police-administered blood alcohol test is an
appropriate remedy if a suspect is denied by police a reasonable to obtain an
independent test.57 In response to Tompkins’ argument that the officer
failed to inform him of his right to choose his clinic and nurse, the court
noted an officer has no affirmative duty to assist a suspect in obtaining an
independent blood alcohol content test.58 While an officer simply cannot
deny a suspect the opportunity to obtain the test,59 the court squarely
rejected the notion that law enforcement has “an affirmative duty to ensure
the accused receives an independent blood test.”60 In this case, the officer
arranged the blood draw and drove the defendant to the hospital.61 The
court determined the officer went above and beyond his duty to Tompkins,

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 795 N.W.2d at 355.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 14
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and if Tompkins objected to the hospital or medical professional performing the blood draw, it was the officer’s duty to object.62
The court also rejected Tompkins’ argument that the use of the State
Crime Lab kit and the involvement of the State Crime Lab in analyzing the
blood sample impermissibly interfered with his right to obtain an
independent blood test.63 The court laid out the rights North Dakota
Century Code section 39-20-02 affords an accused regarding an independent blood test.64 First, the accused has the right to the independent
blood test.65 Second, the accused has the right to choose who administers
the test.66 The court noted it has ruled in the past that it is the accused duty
to assert these rights.67 Therefore, it was not law enforcement that failed to
afford Tompkins these rights, but Tompkins that failed to assert his own
rights.68
Tompkins attempted to use Alaska cases which placed strict
restrictions on government involvement in independent blood tests.69 The
court demonstrated, however, that Alaska’s independent blood test statute
places affirmative duties on those who administer the tests to inform the
defendant of his or her rights.70 North Dakota does not have a similar
provision in its independent test statute.71 The court, therefore, ruled the
Alaska cases were inapplicable to North Dakota.72
Because the court ruled the government did not impermissibly interfere
with Tompkins’ right to obtain and independent blood test, the court held
the lower court should not have suppressed the blood test.73 However,
because the error did not affect the criminal judgment due to Tompkins’
conditional plea of guilty, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
district court’s criminal judgment.74

62. Id.
63. Id. ¶ 16, 795 N.W.2d at 356.
64. Id. ¶ 18.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. ¶ 19 (citing Moberg v. Municipality of Anchorage, 152 P.3d 1170, 1174 n.5 (Alaska
Ct. App. 2007); McCormick v. Municipality of Anchorage, 999 P.2d 155, 163 (Alaska Ct. App.
2000)).
70. Id. ¶ 20, 795 N.W.2d at 357.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. ¶ 23.
74. Id.
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AUTOMOBILES—EVIDENCE OF SOBRIETY TESTS—PROCEDURE;
EVIDENCE AND FACT QUESTIONS
Lange v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
In Lange v. North Dakota Department of Transportation,75 the North
Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) appealed the district court’s
reversal of a DOT hearing officer’s suspension of Lange’s driving
privileges for ninety-one days.76
Lange’s driving privileges were
suspended after she was arrested for driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.77 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the
district court’s decision, and reinstated the hearing officer’s suspension of
Lange’s driving privileges.78
Lange was stopped by Mandan Police Officer Michael Kapella after
the officer observed her vehicle drift on the roadway.79 Lange failed both a
field sobriety test and an SD-5 breath test.80 She had spoken to her attorney
on her cell phone prior to taking the SD-5 test.81 Lange was transported to
Morton County Jail, where she requested a blood test to determine her
blood alcohol content.82 After speaking with her attorney again, Lange
requested the blood test take place at the hospital.83 The officer informed
Lange that blood draws were normally done at the jail by a nurse.84
Thereafter, a nurse took Lange’s blood sample, and the results indicated her
blood alcohol content was over the legal limit.85
At the administrative hearing, the hearing officer concluded Officer
Kapella understood Lange requested her blood draw take place at the
hospital, but Lange did not clearly communicate that she wanted an
independent blood draw and no one impeded her ability to obtain an
independent blood draw.86 The hearing officer, therefore, admitted the

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

2010 ND 201, 790 N.W.2d 28.
Lange, ¶ 1, 790 N.W.2d at 29-30.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
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results of the blood test and suspended Lange’s driving privileges.87 Lange
appealed the decision to the district court.88 The district court reversed the
hearing officer’s decision, ruling the officer should have concluded it was
possible Lange was requesting an independent blood draw and he should
have tried to clarify what Lange wanted.89
On appeal, the DOT argued Lange did not make a reasonable request
for an independent blood draw.90 Lange argued her communications were
sufficient to at least prompt Officer Kapella to clarify her intentions.91 The
supreme court began its analysis by noting the great deference it gives to an
administrative hearing’s decision.92 It noted its review is limited to the
record filed with the court and it does not make independent findings of
fact.93
The court then explained that while law enforcement chooses the type
and location of its own chemical test, an arrestee is entitled to obtain an
independent test at his or her own expense, by a medically qualified
individual of the arrestee’s choosing, and in the location of his or her
choosing.94 If law enforcement denies an arrestee the right to an
independent chemical test, the results of law enforcement’s test may be
suppressed or the charges dismissed.95
It is incumbent upon the arrestee to request the independent test.96 The
arrestee’s request for an independent test must further be “clear and
unambiguous.”97 If the arrestee’s statements are ambiguous, an arrestee
cannot complain about an officer’s reasonable interpretation of those
statements.98 An arrestee, however, need not use any particular words to
request an independent test.99 A law enforcement officer should attempt to
clarify an ambiguous statement the officer believes may invoke the right to
an independent chemical test, even if the arrestee does not use the words
“independent test.”100 However, the court has ruled “if the law enforcement

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. ¶ 4.
91. Id.
92. Id. ¶ 5.
93. Id. at 31.
94. Id. ¶ 6.
95. Id.
96. Id. ¶ 7, 790 N.W.2d at 32.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. ¶ 8.
100. Id.
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officer does not inquire into the arrestee’s intentions, the arrestee cannot
rely on ambiguous statements.”101
According to Officer Kapella’s testimony he had only interpreted
Lange’s request one way: she wanted an alternate location for the blood
draw.102 The officer also testified that when Lange was told blood draws
were conducted at the jail, she did not object or request an independent
test.103 The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that when it was clear
Officer Kapella was not giving her more information on an independent
test, Lange still did not protest.104 The court also noted Officer Kapella’s
testimony was the only evidence presented and the hearing officer’s
decision was based on that testimony.105
Lange also argued that because Officer Lange told her blood draws
were only done at the jail, she was denied the opportunity to obtain an
independent blood test.106 She supported her claim by arguing that upon
first being told she could not be tested at a different location, she may have
been afraid to make an additional request.107 The DOT argued Lange was
not denied an opportunity to obtain an independent chemical test.108
The court explained that while a law enforcement officer cannot
prevent or hinder an arrestee’s attempt to obtain an independent blood test,
law enforcement is under no obligation to assist in such a request.109 Law
enforcement must at least provide access to a telephone in order to obtain
an independent test.110 In this case, the court ruled it was clear Lange was
afforded the opportunity to obtain an independent blood test, as was
displayed by the fact that she spoke on the phone with her attorney at the
jail.111 The court found no evidence suggesting Lange attempted to obtain
an independent test, but was hindered by law enforcement.112 The court
further found no evidence Lange attempted to make arrangements for an
independent test at all.113 Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court held
the hearing officer’s decision was supported by the facts, and law

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11, 790 N.W.2d at 33.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id.
Id.
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enforcement did not interfere with Lange’s right to obtain an independent
blood test.114

114. Id.
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES—SEARCHES AND SEIZURES—
SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT
State v. Huber
In State v. Huber,115 Jason Huber appealed the district court’s criminal
judgment convicting him of possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of
a controlled substance, and manufacture of a controlled substance.116
Huber argued the district court should have suppressed the police’s search
of his apartment.117 The North Dakota Supreme Court held the discovery of
evidence in Huber’s apartment without a warrant was justified under the
emergency exception to the warrant requirement, upholding Huber’s
conviction.118
On December 11, 2009, Huber’s landlord received a phone call from a
tenant complaining of a “terrible odor” in the apartment building.119 The
landlord went to investigate the smell and, being unsure of its source, called
the Mandan Fire Department.120 Two firefighters and the landlord checked
all of the other apartments except Huber’s before proceeding to Huber’s.121
By the time they were ready to check Huber’s apartment, two Mandan
Police Officers had arrived to help identify the source of the smell, which
was routine procedure.122 The landlord knocked on the door, but received
no response.123 The landlord, who had the right of entry for emergency
purposes, then began to unlock the door.124 At this point, Huber opened the
door a crack, and a very strong ammonia and chemical smell emitted from
inside that apartment.125 When the emergency personnel attempted to gain
entry by explaining the situation to Huber, he refused to let them in.126
Mandan Police Officer Bill Stepp then ordered Huber to step aside so
the firemen could investigate the source of the smell.127 Huber stepped

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

2011 ND 23, 793 N.W.2d 781.
Huber, ¶ 1, 793 N.W.2d at 782.
Id. ¶ 9, 793 N.W.2d at 784.
Id. ¶ 1, 793 N.W.2d at 782.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. at 783.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
Id.
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aside, and as they entered the apartment, a lit propane torch fell to the
floor.128 Once inside, the firefighters and police found a partial apparatus
for making methamphetamine, as well as several other indicators of
methamphetamine production, such as the torn off outer casings of lithium
batteries.129 Huber was arrested, and the Mandan Police obtained a search
warrant before going back to seize the evidence.130
Huber filed a motion to suppress with the district court, arguing there
was no emergency or exigent circumstances which justified the police’s
warrantless entry of his apartment.131 The district court denied his motion
to suppress, noting the landlord’s right of entry and the efforts of
emergency personnel to secure the safety of tenants rather than conduct a
thorough search.132 Huber then conditionally pled guilty, reserving the
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.133
On appeal, Huber argued there were no exigent or emergency
circumstances justifying law enforcement’s warrantless entry into his
apartment.134 The supreme court began its analysis with the Fourth
Amendment, stating “[t]he right to be secure in one’s home against
unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed in the United States
Constitution.”135 This means, according to the court, that when a search or
seizure is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement
must obtain a warrant to conduct the search.136 The court also noted,
however, that emergencies or exigent circumstances may present an
exception to the general warrant requirement.137
The court defined an exigent circumstance as “‘an emergency situation
requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage
to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction
of evidence.’”138 The court also defined the emergency exception, stating
“‘the emergency exception does not involve officers investigating a crime;
rather, the officers are assisting citizens or protecting property as part of
their general caretaking responsibilities to the public.’”139 The court ruled

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id. ¶ 6, 793 N.W.2d at 784.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 12 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
Id. (citing State v. Hammer, 2010 ND 152, ¶ 11, 787 N.W.2d 716, 720).
Id.
Id. at 784-85 (quoting State v. DeCoteau, 1999 ND 77, ¶ 15, 592 N.W.2d 579, 584).
Id. ¶ 13 (quoting State v. Matthews, 2003 ND 108, ¶ 13, 665 N.W.2d 28, 32).
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the emergency exception was more applicable under Huber’s circumstances, because firefighters and police entered the apartment not to
investigate a crime, but to investigate the source of a potentially dangerous
smell.140
The court then recited the three requirements to invoke the emergency
exception.141 First, the police must have a reasonable basis to believe an
emergency is taking place, and there is an immediate need for action to
protect life or property.142 Second, the officer’s primary motive must not
have been to arrest or seize evidence.143 Third, there must be a reasonable
basis, approximating probable cause, that the emergency is associated with
the place to be searched.144
The supreme court then proceeded to analyze each element, beginning
with whether it was reasonable for the officers to believe an emergency was
at hand.145 In determining the whether an officer reasonably believed an
emergency exists, the court uses an objective standard.146 While Huber
pointed out there was a significant time lapse between the call to the
landlord and the 911 call, and the firefighters initially responded under the
impression there was no emergency, the court noted many people on the
scene testified they believed it was an emergency.147 Officer Jessica Doolin
told Huber it was an emergency when she asked him to open the door.148
Officer Stepp also stated he believed they should enter the apartment to
check for an emergency because of the large about of ammonia and
chemical smell emerging from the apartment.149 The testimony of all of the
emergency responders as a whole reflected a belief that the ammonia smell
presented a serious risk to the building’s occupants.150 For this reason, the
court ruled it was reasonable for the officers to believe an emergency was at
hand.151
Next, the court analyzed whether the search of Huber’s apartment was
motivated by a desire for seize evidence.152 The court noted law enforce-

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 15-16, 793 N.W.2d at 785-86.
Id. ¶ 16, 793 N.W.2d at 786.
Id.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 19.
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ment stayed back and did not help in the search until the evidence of a
methamphetamine lab was found.153 The court then ruled that upon finding
this lab, the dangers worsened and law enforcement was justified in
entering further to assist in searching the apartment.154 The search was
justified because a methamphetamine lab’s volatile nature requires an
immediate search to dissipate the danger.155 Therefore, the court found the
police were not primarily motivated by finding evidence when they entered
the apartment.156
Finally, the court analyzed whether the police had a reasonable basis,
approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the place to
be searched.157 The circumstances indicated the odor that was the subject
of the emergency could logically be connected to Huber’s apartment.158
Every other unit had been searched and no source had been found for the
odor; Huber’s windows were open in subzero temperatures; and when
Huber opened his door, fumes poured out of the apartment.159 These
circumstances were enough, according to court, to satisfy the third
requirement.160
Therefore, the supreme court held the emergency exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applied, and law
enforcement was justified in entering Huber’s apartment without a
warrant.161 The supreme court upheld the district court’s denial of Huber’s
motion to suppress and upheld the criminal judgment.162
Justice Crothers specially concurred to state that while he agreed with
the majority’s decision, he wanted to clarify the need for a warrant once the
emergency has dissipated.163 Justice Crothers noted that while multiple
entries may be justified under the facts of a certain case, the emergency
exception does not give law enforcement a passkey to enter the premises at
any time in the future.164 When the emergency has dissipated will depend

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. ¶ 21, 793 N.W.2d at 787.
Id. ¶ 22, 793 N.W.2d at 787-88.
Id. at 788.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id. ¶ 24.
Id. ¶ 25.
Id. ¶¶ 25-26, 793 N.W.2d at 788-89.
Id. ¶ 26, 793 N.W.2d at 789.
Id. ¶ 28.
Id.
Id. ¶ 30 (Crothers, J., concurring).
Id. ¶¶ 30, 33, 793 N.W.2d at 789-90.

434

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87:419

on the facts of the case and, at that time, law enforcement will be required
to obtain a warrant to reenter the premises.165

165. Id. ¶ 35.
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CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—OTHER MISCONDUCT BY
ACCUSED
State v. Aabrekke
In State v. Aabrekke,166 Ivan Lee Aabrekke appealed the criminal
judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition,
as well as the denial of his motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a
new trial.167 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a
new trial, holding the district court failed to properly apply the analysis
under the North Dakota Rules of Evidence to determine whether prior act
evidence is admissible.168
Aabrekke was charged with gross sexual imposition North Dakota
Century Code section 12.1-20-03(1)(d).169 The State alleged Aabrekke
engaged in a sexual act with his thirteen-year-old granddaughter, the
complainant, on August 16, 2009.170 The alleged incident occurred in
Aabrekke’s home in Minnewauken, North Dakota.171 Prior to trial,
Aabrekke moved to exclude evidence that he “has a history of engaging in
various types of sexual activity with the [complainant] and that this activity
has occurred over the years” as well as evidence that “relatives of
[Aabrekke] may have engaged in sexual acts with either the [complainant],
or the [complainant’s] mother.”172 The district court denied the motion,
allowing the evidence which could “show motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.”173 At trial, Aabrekke’s granddaughter testified a sexual act
occurred on the morning of August 19, 2009 while she, her mother, and her
brother were staying at Aabrekke’s home for the weekend.174 The
complainant did not tell her mother, Aabrekke’s daughter, about the
incident until after they had returned to their home in Minnesota.175 The

166.
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168.
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complainant’s mother then informed authorities in Minnesota of the
incident.176
After the complainant testified about the August 16, 2009 incident, the
State asked the complainant if she had previously told her mother about any
sexual contact.177 Aabrekke objected to the question, and the court
questioned the State out of the presence of the jury about what the State
intended to prove by the question.178 During the colloquy, the State argued
the evidence was indicative of a continuing course of conduct by Aabrekke,
and the continuing course of conduct amounted to plan or preparation.179
Aabrekke, on the other hand, argued the evidence was being offered as
character evidence to make the alleged incident seem more likely.180
Aabrekke also argued the prejudicial nature of the evidence “far
outweighed” the probative value because the prosecution does not need the
evidence to prove the elements of gross sexual imposition.181 The district
court allowed the evidence, ruling the evidence fit within the exception to
North Dakota Rule of Evidence 404(b) allowing evidence of prior crimes,
wrongs, or acts if it is introduced for other purposes besides proving
conformity with such acts.182
The complainant went on to testify Aabrekke had engaged in prior
sexual contact with her.183 The complainant also testified Aabrekke had
raped the complainant’s mother in the past.184 During the complainant’s
mother testimony, the State questioned her about past sexual abuse she
experienced in the family.185 Aabrekke objected to this testimony as well,
arguing the testimony was irrelevant, but the court allowed the testimony as
proof that “there are not strong defense mechanisms within the family.”186
The prosecution then used this testimony to explain why the complainant
did not tell her mother about the incident immediately.187
On appeal, Aabrekke argued the district court erred in allowing
evidence of prior sexual contact with his granddaughter, as well as his
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daughter’s testimony about being raped by her uncle.188 Aabrekke also
argued the district court failed to apply the proper three-prong analysis for
admitting prior bad act evidence, and the court failed to give a cautionary
instruction regarding the limited purpose of the evidence.189 Finally,
Aabrekke argued the danger of unfair prejudice inherent in the evidence of
his prior acts outweighed the probative value of the evidence.190
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis by pointing out
that it has repeatedly warned courts about the dangers of allowing evidence
of prior acts to show propensity.191 The court then outlined the general rule
for admitting evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts, found in North
Dakota Rule of Evidence 404(b).192 Rule 404(b) first makes evidence of
prior crimes, wrongs, or other acts inadmissible to prove conformity
therewith.193 The rule does not, however, make such evidence inadmissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.194 In other
words, the evidence must be “substantially relevant for some purpose other
than” showing the person’s character and the person’s conformity
therewith.195
When considering this evidence, the court noted “the mere invocation
of an exception does not end the inquiry,” but the district court must instead
apply a three-step analysis to determine whether the evidence is
admissible.196 First, “the [district] court must look to the purpose for which
the evidence is introduced.”197 Next, the district court must determine if the
of the prior act is “substantially reliable or clear and convincing.”198
Finally, in criminal cases, there must be proof of the crime alleged
independent of the prior act, which permits the trier of fact to establish guilt
or innocence.199 The district court may satisfy the third prong by a
cautionary instruction warning the jury of the limited purpose of the prior
act evidence.200 Even if all three prongs are satisfied, the district court must
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still consider whether the prejudicial effect of the prior act evidence
outweighs the probative value of the evidence under Rule 403.201
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that in several cases—State v.
Paul,202 State v. Alvarado,203 and State v. Christensen—204evidence prior
acts and crimes had been admitted for a variety of purposes other than
showing conformity with criminal character.205 The court also noted the
“common thread” among these cases was that the district court was required
to conduct the necessary analysis under Rules 404(b) and 403 and give the
proper cautionary instruction.206 The supreme court ruled the State’s
purpose for presenting the evidence—to show planning, preparation, and
grooming, as well as to prove why the complainant did not tell her mother
about the conduct immediately—was a proper purpose under North Dakota
Rule of Evidence 404(b).207 However, the supreme court found no
evidence in the record that the district court applied the three-prong analysis
to the prior act evidence the State sought to introduce, or that the district
court gave the proper limiting instruction to the jury to ensure the evidence
was only considered for its stated limited purpose.208
Because the supreme court found the district court misapplied the law
when weighing the admission of the prior bad act evidence, it held the
district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.209 The court
did not pass judgment on whether the evidence would be admissible if the
correct analysis was applied.210 Rather, the North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.211
Justice Sandstrom dissented, concluding the district court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the evidence of Aabrekke’s prior acts.212 Justice
Sandstrom reasoned that the district court properly allowed the
complainant’s testimony about prior victimization by Aabrekke as evidence
of “plan and the like.”213 Justice Sandstrom also noted the defendant’s
questioning elicited some of the evidence, thus making it unobjectable, and
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the evidence of the other family member’s prior sexual abuse acts against
the complainant’s mother were not admitted to show Aabrekke’s conformity therewith.214 Furthermore, Justice Sandstrom reasoned that while the
district court did not give a cautionary instruction, a district court is not
required to give such an instruction unless requested by a party.215 As a
result, Justice Sandstrom would have affirmed the district court’s
decision.216

214. Id. ¶¶ 27-28.
215. Id. ¶¶ 30-31, 800 N.W.2d at 295.
216. Id. ¶ 34.
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CRIMINAL LAW—QUESTIONS OF FACT AND FINDINGS—POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
Johnson v. State
In Johnson v. State,217 Johnson appealed from the summary dismissal
of his application for post-conviction relief.218 The North Dakota Supreme
Court ruled summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief
was not appropriate because res judicata is an affirmative defense and a
district court cannot dismiss a proceeding on the basis of res judicata on the
court’s own motion.219 The court reversed the judgment and remanded for
further proceedings.220
Johnson was convicted of two counts of contact by bodily fluids in
2008.221 The trial consisted of both a criminal act phase and a criminal
responsibility phase.222 On appeal from the trial, the North Dakota
Supreme Court summarily upheld the conviction.223 After the appeal,
Johnson applied for post-conviction relief, claiming prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel.224 The district court denied his
application and the North Dakota Supreme Court summarily affirmed the
dismissal on appeal.225 Johnson applied for post-conviction relief a second
time by a letter, which was denied as res judicata.226
Johnson then applied for post-conviction relief a third time, claiming
insufficient evidence as to his criminal responsibility and ineffective
assistance of counsel by both his direct-appeal counsel and first postconviction proceeding counsel.227 The district court summarily dismissed
the application on its own motion, ruling the application was res judicata
because the supreme court had already ruled on the sufficiency of the
evidence regarding his criminal responsibility.228 The district court further
ruled that because the direct appeal lawyer did raise the sufficiency of the
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evidence argument on appeal, Johnson could not claim his direct-appeal
counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue and likewise could not
claim his first post-conviction counsel was ineffective for not raising an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim against his direct-appeal counsel on
the same basis.229
The North Dakota Supreme Court held the district court erred in
summarily dismissing the case because it errantly believed the supreme
court had previously ruled on Johnson’s challenge of the sufficiency of the
evidence on the finding of criminal responsibility.230 The court explained
its ruling in the direct appeal only dealt with the sufficiency of the evidence
concerning the criminal act.231 The court, therefore, had not ruled on
whether the evidence was sufficient to find criminal responsibility, and the
issue could not have been res judicata.232
The supreme court also held that while the district court does have the
power to summarily dismiss an application for post-conviction relief on
grounds of res judicata, the district court does not have the power to do so
sua sponte.233 Res judicata and misuse of process are affirmative defenses
that must first be pled by the State before the court can summarily dismiss
the application.234 The court, therefore, reversed the district court’s
summary dismissal of Johnson’s application for post-conviction relief and
remanded the matter for further proceedings.235
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INFANTS—RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS TO ADULT
PROSECUTIONS—JUVENILE TRANSFERS AND
CERTIFICATIONS
IN RE R.A.
In In re R.A.,236 R.A. appealed a juvenile court order transferring
jurisdiction to district court under North Dakota Century Code section 2720-34(1)(b).237 He also appealed the district court order affirming the
transfer.238 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding the
juvenile court did not err in finding probable cause existed, the juvenile
court did not misinterpret or misapply the transfer statute, and R.A.’s
confrontation rights were not violated.239
A delinquency petition and notice of intent to transfer to district court
was filed in March 2010, alleging R.A. committed the offenses of gross
sexual imposition, terrorizing, and harassment.240 The delinquency petition
specifically alleged R.A. had engaged in a sexual act with A.H., another
juvenile, by compelling her to submit by threat of imminent death or serious
bodily injury.241
During the transfer hearing, A.H. testified to the circumstances that
lead to the allegations against R.A.242 The State also offered copies of
numerous text messages and other written messages that A.H. had received
from R.A.243 A.H. testified she had previously been in a dating relationship
with R.A. from November 2008 to August 2009, but after their dating
relationship ended, the two of them remained friends.244 A.H. testified she
spoke on the phone to R.A., received text messages from his cellular phone,
and received Facebook messages from him everyday from February 18,
2010 to February 28, 2010.245 She further testified R.A. told her drug
dealers were attempting to get his uncle to traffic drugs and, as a result, he
was being threatened.246 R.A. told A.H. the drug dealers were threatening
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to harm her, as well, and if they went to the police, the drug dealers would
find out and kill them both.247 R.A. told A.H. they had to comply with the
drug dealers demands at all times, if they wanted to stay alive.248
A.H. testified to numerous demands made by the drug dealers.249
According to her testimony, the drug dealers demanded she change her
relationship status on Facebook to reflect she was in a relationship with
R.A.250 In one instance, she received a text message from R.A.’s cell phone
that stated R.A. was being drugged because she did not comply with the
demand fast enough.251 A.H. also testified she received other text
messages, which she believed were from the drug dealers, advising her she
was being watched to ensure she complied with their demands.252 In
another instance on February 22, 2010, A.H. received a Facebook message
from R.A.’s account demanding that she be with R.A. sexually.253 A.H.
testified the next day she invited R.A. to her house and he gave her a
hickey, claiming it was one of the demands.254 R.A. also tried to have sex
with A.H., there was penetration, and R.A. again claimed it was one of the
demands.255
On February 24, 2010, before leaving on a trip to New York, A.H.
testified R.A. called and told her the drug dealers were demanding she
come over to his house and kiss him before she left town.256 However,
A.H. testified she was unable to go to R.A.’s house before leaving town,
and on February 25, 2010, she received a text message from R.A. indicating
the drug dealers had drugged him and he had to go to the hospital.257 While
traveling to New York, A.H. then received a message from R.A.’s
Facebook account making several demands for her to tell her friends that
R.A. gave her a hickey, purchase R.A. an expensive gift, call and meet with
R.A. as soon as she returned home, and perform oral sex on each other.258
The message also stated that if A.H. only completed two of the demands,

247. Id.
248. Id. R.A. told A.H. that if they did not comply, the drug dealers were “gonna take my
dick and shove it up your pussy and take a knife and put it there too and turn it around and rotate
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R.A. would be drugged enough to make him sick and if she chose to only
complete one of the demands, R.A. would be electrocuted.259 A.H. testified
she told her friends about the threats after they became suspicious of her
behavior.260
Between February 27, 2010 and February 28, 2010, A.H. testified she
received numerous demands from the drug dealers.261 These demands
included apologizing to R.A. for failing to tell him she loved him, having
sex with R.A., and performing sexual acts on R.A., as well as time limits by
which she needed to respond or the drug dealers “would make many people
feel pain.”262 A.H. testified she tried to negotiate with the drug dealers, but
they told her “she needed to give her answer or they would rape her.”263 On
February 28, 2010, A.H. returned from New York and invited R.A. over to
her house.264 A.H. testified she showed R.A. the text messages she had
received and they decided they should cooperate with the demands of the
drug dealers.265 A.H. testified she and R.A. performed oral sex on each
other; however, she also testified she felt uncomfortable, was very upset,
and kept crying.266 She further testified “she only participated to keep R.A.
and herself safe and alive.”267
Approximately a half an hour after R.A. left her house, A.H. testified
she received another message from the drug dealers through her Facebook
account.268 The message stated the drug dealers were not satisfied and
indicated they saw her crying inside her house.269 The drug dealers
demanded A.H. go over to R.A.’s house and give him his present by 3:00
a.m. or they were going to drug him and he would probably die.270 A.H.
testified she locked the doors to her house, closed the blinds, and went into
her bedroom and cried because she was so scared.271
During the transfer hearing, A.H.’s mother also testified.272 She
testified A.H.’s friends showed her the numerous Facebook messages in
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. ¶ 14. These demands came through text messages sent from R.A.’s cell phone and a
Facebook message sent to A.H. Id.
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A.H.’s account.273 A.H.’s mother testified she went to R.A.’s house and
met with him and one of his parents.274 According to A.H.’s mother,
although R.A. initially claimed he was being threatened, he finally admitted
to writing and sending the messages to A.H.275
Following the transfer hearing, the judicial referee found probable
cause existed to believe R.A. “committed the offense of gross sexual
imposition by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or
kidnapping . . . .”276 The judicial referee also ordered the case be transferred to district court under North Dakota Century Code section 27-2034(1)(b).277 Subsequently, R.A. argued “the evidence did not support a
finding of probable cause, the judicial referee misinterpreted or misapplied
the transfer statute because the statute requires the threats be to the victim
and not another person, and his confrontation rights were violated.”278
Therefore, he requested a district court judge review the judicial referee’s
findings and order.279 The district court affirmed as well as adopted the
judicial referee’s findings and order.280
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the juvenile
court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard of review.281
R.A. first argued it was an error for the juvenile court to transfer jurisdiction
to district court because the State failed to establish probable cause and
failed to present any evidence that R.A. acted by force or his conduct
presented an imminent threat to A.H.282 R.A. next argued the charge of
gross sexual imposition could only be transferred if probable cause existed
to believe there were threats of imminent harm to the victim because the
evidence failed to demonstrate A.H. suffered threats of imminent harm.283
Lastly, R.A. argued his inability to cross-examine A.H. during the transfer
hearing about her sexual history with him resulted in his Sixth Amendment
confrontation rights being violated.284
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R.A.’s first argument was that the threats of physical harm were not
imminent, but instead were threats of future conduct, and this evidence was
insufficient to support the juvenile courts finding of probable cause.285
R.A. asserted his case was similar to Lawrence v. Delkamp286 and Ficklin v.
Ficklin,287 where the court previously held that “district court’s findings of
domestic violence were clearly erroneous because the threats of physical
harm were not imminent.”288 After an examination of Lawrence and
Ficklin, the court determined R.A.’s case was distinguishable based upon
the juvenile court’s findings.289 During the transfer hearing, A.H. testified
she believed the threats were being carried out and, if she did not comply
with the deadlines, the drug dealers would harm R.A.290 A.H. also testified
she believed the drug dealers were watching her constantly and were able to
act immediately if she did not comply with their demands.291 The court
noted “imminent” means close or near at hand rather than touching; it does
not mean immediate.292 Based upon the evidence presented at the transfer
hearing, the court determined a finding of probable cause to believe threats
of imminent death or serious bodily injury was supported.293
R.A. also claimed there was conflicting evidence and the actions of
A.H. failed to denote a fear of imminent physical harm.294 However, the
court emphasized a transfer hearing is comparable to a preliminary examination in a criminal proceeding, and the juvenile court does not determine the
credibility of the evidence presented because questions regarding conflicting evidence or credibility are questions of fact for a jury to decide.295 The
court held “the juvenile court did not err in finding there [was] substantial
evidence establishing probable cause to believe R.A. committed the offense

285. Id. ¶ 19, 799 N.W.2d at 338.
286. 2000 ND 214, 620 N.W.2d 151. The North Dakota Supreme Court found the findings
of domestic violence in Lawrence to be clearly erroneous because the district court did not make
any findings regarding immediate fear or imminent physical harm at the time the threats were
made. Lawrence, ¶¶ 10, 12, 620 N.W.2d at 155.
287. 2006 ND 40, 710 N.W.2d 387. The threats in Ficklin could not be defined as actual or
imminent because the wife’s fear was a perceived fear of future possibility, and therefore, the
North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court’s issuance of a domestic violence protection
order clearly erroneous. Ficklin, ¶¶ 21-22, 710 N.W.2d at 392.
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of gross sexual imposition by threat of imminent death or serious bodily
injury.”296
The court next addressed whether the juvenile court misinterpreted and
misapplied North Dakota Century Code section 27-20-34.297 Specifically,
R.A. argued the plain language of the gross sexual imposition statute
required that there be probable cause to believe threats of imminent harm
were made to the victim before a case could be transferred from juvenile
court to district court.298 R.A. alleged the evidence did not show A.H.
suffered threats of imminent harm and, therefore, his case was transferred
erroneously.299
The court explained when it examines statutes, each word is given its
ordinary meaning; however, if a statute is ambiguous or if an absurd or
ludicrous result is reached by adhering to the strict letter, they may look at
extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, to interpret the statute’s meaning.300 Although the court presumes the legislature did not intend a statute
to yield an absurd or ludicrous result or unjust consequence, a statute is
deemed ambiguous “if it is susceptible to different, rational meanings.”301
The plain language of section 27-20-34(1)(b) indicates the crime of
gross sexual imposition of a victim by threat of imminent death, serious
bodily injury, or kidnapping shall be transferred.302 After an examination of
the plain language of this statute, the court decided the statute was not
ambiguous.303 However, R.A. was charged with gross sexual imposition in
violation of section 12.1-20-03(1)(a), “which states that an individual is
guilty of gross sexual imposition if he engages in a sexual act with another
or causes another to engage in a sexual act by compelling the victim to
submit . . . by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or
kidnapping, to be inflicted on any human being.”304
R.A. argued because the wording of section 27-20-34 does not use the
language “inflicted on any human being,” like section 12.1-20-03(1)(a), the
threat must be inflicted on the victim.305 The court found the difference in
wording of these two statutes insignificant.306 In support of its finding, the
296.
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300.
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court indicated the legislature included several offenses in the transfer
statute they determined should be transferred to district court, including
gross sexual imposition under section 12.1-20-03(1)(a).307 The court noted
the purpose of section 27-20-34 was to transfer violent crimes to district
court and gross sexual imposition by force or threat of imminent harm is a
transferrable crime.308 After determining the evidence supported the
juvenile court’s finding, the court held R.A.’s case was properly transferred
to district court and the transfer statute was not misinterpreted or
misapplied.309
Lastly, the court explained R.A.’s confrontation rights were not
violated when he was not allowed to cross-examine A.H. regarding her
sexual history with him.310 The court began by stating that although the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause grants criminal defendant’s the
right to physically face whoever is testifying against them, a juvenile
involved in a juvenile transfer hearing is not entitled all of the constitutional
guarantees granted in a criminal proceeding.311 However, a juvenile
transfer hearing must satisfy the basic requirements of due process and
fairness because it is considered a “critically important” proceeding.312 The
court emphasized A.H. testified at the transfer hearing and R.A. crossexamined her, and therefore, the issue raised by R.A. was an issue of the
admissibility of evidence rather than a confrontation issue.313 The court
indicated that during a juvenile transfer hearing, a juvenile is not allowed
greater evidentiary protection than criminal defendants receive at pretrial
proceedings.314 Because the rules of evidence do not apply during a
juvenile transfer hearing, the court held R.A.’s Sixth Amendment
confrontation rights were not violated.315
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JUDGMENT—SUMMARY PROCEEDING—NATURE OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Locken v. Locken
In Locken v. Locken,316 David Locken appealed the district court’s
summary judgment dismissal of his action to determine his ownership
interest in a tract of land in Dickey County.317 Locken argued his claim was
not barred by the statute of limitations under North Dakota Century Code
section 28-01-42 for an action on a contract for deed.318 The North Dakota
Supreme Court held the statute of limitations for a contract for deed did bar
David Locken’s claim.319 The supreme court concluded that for a debt
secured by a contract for deed, the due date of the last payment is the day
when the contract was satisfied.320
David Locken purchased a tract of land with his father, Virgil Locken,
in February of 1973 from Wanda Johnson and Ardys Sand by a contract for
deed.321 The final payment on the contract for deed was scheduled for
March 1, 1998, and upon full performance of the contract for deed, Johnson
and Sand would convey to Virgil and David Locken a warranty deed.322 In
1974, David Locken assigned his interest in the tract of land to Virgil and
Marjorie Locken.323 In 1977, Sand and Johnson conveyed the land by
warranty deed to Virgil Locken individually.324 The deed was recorded in
March of 1978.325 Virgil Locken then gifted the land to his children, except
David Locken, who then conveyed the interest in the land to the Virgil and
Marjorie Locken Family Trust.326
Marjorie Locken died in 2001 and devised by will her interest in the
land to David Locken.327 Virgil Locken died in 2006, and his will also
devised all of his interest in the land to David Locken.328 In 2007, Loren
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Locken, trustee of the Virgil and Marjorie Locken Family Trust, executed
and recorded an affidavit of possession.329 The Trust then conveyed the
land to Bernard Vculek.330
David Locken brought an action in January 2008, claiming Marjorie
Locken had a one-fourth interest in the land when she died and he was
entitled to that one-fourth interest as a devisee of her will.331 The
defendants responded by arguing the statute of limitations had run and the
Marketable Record Title Act, therefore, barred the action.332 The district
court granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion and dismissed the
case, ruling the statute of limitations had expired and the claim was not
subject to a statutory exception.333
On appeal, David Locken argued the district court erred in finding his
January 2008 action was barred by the statute of limitations because he
brought the action within ten years of the due date of the final payment of
the contract for deed.334 Locken argued under North Dakota Century Code
section 28-01-42, “due date” means the date the last payment was last
scheduled, not the date the last payment was actually made.335 The
defendant argued “due date” means “the date the last payment was actually
made and the contract for deed was satisfied.”336
The North Dakota Supreme Court first outlined the Marketable Record
Title Act, noting that a person with possession of a piece of land and
unbroken chain of title to an interest in the land may convey the land free
and clear of any claim based upon an “act, transaction, event, or omission
occurring twenty years or more before,” and bars the action from
commencing.337 However, “the provisions for marketable record title do
not ‘bar . . . [r]ights founded upon any mortgage, trust deed, or contract for
sale of lands which is not barred by the statute of limitations.’”338
Therefore, if David Locken’s claim was not barred by the statute of
limitations for a contract for sale of lands, or a contract for deed in this case,
his claim would also not be barred by the Marketable Record Title Act.339
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The supreme court next considered whether the statute of limitations as
codified in North Dakota Century Code section 28-01-42 had run when
David Locken brought his claim in January 2008.340 The statute bars an
action to cancel or enforce a contract for the sale or conveyance of real
estate after twenty years from the recording of the instrument unless fewer
than ten years have elapsed from the due date of the last payment of the
debt on the contract or fewer than ten years since the claim for relief
accrued.341 Because the statute “do[es] not necessarily contemplate earlier
satisfaction of a contract for deed,” the supreme court ruled the interrelationship between this statute and section 28-01-15(2)-requiring title actions
to be brought within ten years after relief has accrued-was ambiguous, and
it could look to extrinsic aids beyond the plain language to interpret
them.342
In order to interpret the statutes, the court looked to the Iowa Supreme
Court’s interpretation of an Iowa statute similar to North Dakota’s section
28-01-42.343 The Iowa courts explained “a mortgage remains in effect until
the debt is paid or discharged, or the mortgage is released.”344 The North
Dakota Supreme Court also noted the Iowa authorities made clear the intent
of the statutes was to clarify titles to real property from the record itself.345
Citing this purpose, the court construed “due date of the last payment on the
indebtedness or part thereof, secured thereby” to mean the date in the record
the contract for deed is satisfied.346
As a result, the court ruled that because David Locken brought the
action in January 2008, more than ten years after the March 1978
satisfaction of the contract for deed, the action was barred by the statute of
limitations.347 The court therefore affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment and dismissal of the action.348
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VENDOR AND PURCHASER—RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
PARTIES—BONA FIDE PURCHASERS
Swanson v. Swanson
In Swanson v. Swanson,349 Glenn Swanson appealed the district court’s
judgment quieting title to real property in Michael Swanson, James
Swanson, Robert Swanson, and Candyce Swanson (the Swanson
children).350 The North Dakota Supreme Court held the district court erred
in analyzing the notice requirement for a good faith purchaser and erred in
finding the Swanson children acted in good faith when purchasing the
property.351 The court, therefore, reversed the judgment and remanded the
case for judgment consistent with the opinion.352
In 1963, William Swanson and Lorraine Swanson, his wife, conveyed a
piece of real estate in Bottineau County to William Swanson and Glenn
Swanson, William’s brother, as joint tenants by a warranty deed.353 The
property had originally been owned by Glenn and William’s stepmother,
Anna Swanson, who had conveyed the property to William with Glenn’s
help.354 Lorrain had no ownership interest in the land, but was apparently
included in the deed to disclaim any homestead claim. Glenn and William
never recorded the deed.355 In 1969, Glenn Swanson recorded a mortgage
on the property in favor of Arlo Swanson, his brother.356
William Swanson died in 1999.357 At William’s 1999 funeral in
Florida, Glenn Swanson asked Lorraine Swanson to look for William’s
copy of the joint tenancy deed.358 Despite Glenn’s assertion of ownership,
Lorraine, as personal representative for the estate, conveyed the property to
herself as trustee of her revocable trust in 2000.359 In 2001, at an inurnment
ceremony for William, Glenn again asserted his interest in the property, this
time to William and Lorraine’s son, Robert Swanson.360 In 2003, Lorraine,
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as trustee for her revocable trust, conveyed property to the Swanson
children.361 The deed was recorded on July 21, 2003.362
Glenn found the joint tenancy deed in 2005, two years after the
Swanson children recorded their deed.363 Glenn recorded his joint tenancy
deed in November 2005.364 In January 2008, the Swanson children initiated
a quiet title action against Glenn Swanson.365 Glenn counterclaimed to
quiet title in his name and also brought a third-party action against Lorrain
Swanson based on her conveyance in 1963 warranty deed.366 The district
court ruled Glenn Swanson had no interest in the claim and quieted title in
the Swanson children because the children acted in good faith when they
recorded the deed and paid valuable consideration for the property.367
On appeal, Glenn Swanson argued the district court erred in quieting
title in the Swanson children.368 Glenn argued the Swanson children were
not good-faith purchasers and they did not pay valuable consideration for
the land.369 Glenn asserted the district court should have quieted title in
him because, under the 1963 deed, the property should have passed to him
in 1999 as a joint tenant.370
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis by stating the
dispositive issue was whether the Swanson children acted in good faith.371
As the court noted, good faith depends on whether the children had actual
or constructive notice of Glenn Swanson’s claim of ownership of the
land.372 The court then outlined what constitutes actual or constructive
notice.373 Quoting North Dakota Century Code section 1-01-25, the court
explained “[e]very person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient
to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular fact and who omits to
make such inquiry with reasonable diligence is deemed to have constructive
notice of the fact itself.”374 In other words, “a purchaser who fails to make
the requisite inquiry cannot claim the protection of a good-faith
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purchaser . . . .”375 A purchaser who fails to make the requisite inquiry will
be assumed to know any facts such an inquiry would have uncovered.376
The court then broke the inquiry into two parts: first, whether the
Swanson children had actual notice of circumstances which would have put
a prudent person on inquiry as to the ownership of the property;377 and
second, whether the Swanson children did inquire into the circumstances as
was their duty after having actual notice of the circumstances.378 The court
ruled the Swanson children did have actual notice of Glenn Swanson’s
claim and, therefore, had a duty to inquire into that claim.379 To support
this ruling, the supreme court pointed to the fact that Glenn Swanson
informed Robert Swanson, one of the Swanson children, of his claim to the
property at the 2001 inurnment ceremony.380 The court noted a statement
by a claimant to an adverse right to a piece of property could be enough to
put a prudent person on inquiry.381 The court also pointed to its own
precedent, which has established a statement of adverse interest need not
lay out all of the details of the adverse interest.382 Thus, the court held the
assertion of ownership to Robert Swanson by Glenn Swanson was enough
to put the Swanson children on inquiry about the ownership of the land.383
The court then turned to whether the Swanson children made any
inquiry into Glenn Swanson’s claim of ownership over the land.384 The
court noted there was no inquiry found in the record, and the district court
even stated it did not know what inquiry had been made.385 In such a
circumstance, a purchaser who has actual notice and has been put on
inquiry can be assumed to know any facts that would probably have been
discovered if properly pursued.386 In this case, the supreme court concluded
it was likely the Swanson children would have found, upon proper inquiry,
that Glenn Swanson had recorded a mortgage on the property in 1969,
which granted Arlo Swanson a security interest in Glenn Swanson’s interest
in the property.387
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The court also dealt with the district court’s ruling that Glenn Swanson
was a “stranger” to the chain of title pursuant to Title Standard 2-01 of the
North Dakota State Bar Association and, therefore, the record or the
mortgage could have been ignored.388 The court rejected this ruling,
pointing to the fact that a prospective purchaser may only ignore a stranger
to the title if the prospective purchaser acted in good faith.389 According to
Title Standard 2-01, “[a]ny circumstances which should cause further
inquiry to be made as to the status of the ‘stranger’ which inquiry would
disclose the unrecorded interest of the ‘stranger’, preclude ignoring the
‘stranger’s’ conveyance.”390 Here, the Swanson children conducted no
inquiry into Glenn Swanson’s claim of ownership and, therefore, could not
have acted in good faith.391 This not only made the “stranger” claim
invalid, it prevented the Swanson children from claiming good-faith
purchaser status.392
Finally, the court ruled the laches and equitable estoppel defenses
would not be available to the Swanson children for two reasons.393 First,
the Swanson children had not properly pleaded these defenses at the trial
level.394 Second, laches and equitable estoppel were not available unless
the Swanson children were good-faith purchasers, which the court ruled
they were not.395
Justice Sandstrom dissented from the majority because he would have
upheld the lower court’s ruling that the Swanson children were good-faith
purchasers.396 Justice Sandstrom first pointed out that absent a reasonable
investigation into Glenn Swanson’s claim, the Swanson children would
only have been charged with the knowledge of the facts a reasonable
inquiry would have found.397 He reasoned a reasonable inquiry by the
Swanson children would have yielded nothing.398 Justice Sandstrom further
objected to the majority’s ruling that Glenn Swanson was not a “stranger”
to the chain of title, reasoning the Swanson children had no knowledge of
an actual interest held by Glenn Swanson, but only had knowledge of
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Glenn’s claim to an interest.399 Justice Sandstrom warned this ruling would
frustrate the rule of Title Standard 2-01 by allowing an unsubstantiated
claim to establish title.400 Because he would rule the Swanson children
were good faith purchasers, Justice Sandstrom also would have allowed the
Swanson children to pursue the laches and equitable estoppel defenses.401
Chief Justice VandeWalle also dissented.402 The Chief Justice joined
in Justice Sandstrom’s dissent on the issue of good faith, but would have
remanded to the district court to find facts on whether the Swanson children
paid valuable consideration for the land.403 The Chief Justice reasoned that
while there was some evidence in the record indicating the Swanson
children gave valuable consideration for the land, the district court erred in
making its finding of valuable consideration.404 The Chief Justice noted
North Dakota precedent has established that in order to fulfill the “valuable
consideration” prong of good-faith purchaser protection, a purchaser must
give something substantial in exchange for the property.405 In this case, the
record showed the purported consideration given was ten dollars, plus a
promise to visit and care for Lorraine Swanson for the rest of her life.406
The district court did not make any findings of specific financial value for
the support and services given to Lorraine Swanson.407 The district court
framed the question of whether substantial value was given as a question of
whether Lorraine received something of value to her.408 The Chief Justice
explained that to determine whether the consideration was valuable, or
whether the Swanson children parted with something of value, the district
court should have analyzed the value given by the Swanson children against
the fair market value.409 For these reasons, the Chief Justice would have
remanded to the district court to find a specific financial value of the
services the Swanson children promised to Lorraine Swanson and compare
that value with the fair market value to determine whether the Swanson
children parted with something of substantial value.410
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